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Money Laundering Today 
by 
Katherine Simshauser 
In 1983, the Reagan Administration began focusing on stopping money launderers in hopes 
of crippling the $60-120 billion per year illegal drug industry (Gerth 12). Since then, the United 
States has led the international community to pressure nations with tight banking secrecy laws 
to loosen up, and has made it more difficult to launder cash inside the United States. New 
regulations and investigations have halted several major laundering operations. But since July, 
1989, problems have developed with U.S. strategy, and success has slowed. 
Although money laundering has become increasingly complex and the amount of cash 
earned through illegal activity has risen dramatically in the last decade, it is hardly a new problem. 
The Mafia had to launder money to explain the presence of bootlegging profits during prohibition. 
After prohibition, organized criminals continued to operate "front" businesses to support their 
ever-increasing scope of illegal activities, which included (and still include) gambling, prostitu-
tion, loan sharking, and illegal drug manufacturing and selling. Profits from these activities are 
funneled through legitimate businesses like pizza parlors, vending machines, bars, hotels, and 
liquor stores. Since the Mafia is well organized, prosecutors have had little success catching them 
in the act of money washing. 
With increasing use of illegal drugs, new organized criminals who lack the experience, 
power, and structure of the Mafia have also cashed in on the drug trade. The business flourished 
as marijuana use became socially acceptable in the 1970's. Although the Mafia is still quite 
involved in the marijuana trade, they were unable to meet the overwhelming demand for the drug 
and lost control of the market, leaving a place open for the independent drug lords who emerged. 
If marijuana is "Columbian Gold," cocaine has proven to be platinum. It is more marketable 
than heroin, which the Mafia has had a monopoly on for almost a century (Engardio et al., 48). 
Because it is more concentrated and addictive than marijuana, cocaine has also proven more 
profitable. This is made clear by the changes in the way these drugs are transported: 48% of all 
cocaine seized in 1986 was found on private planes, compared to only 5% of all marijuana seized 
(Gerth 12). Enterprising South Americans were able to keep the Mafia out of the business, and 
Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, and Costa Rica were quickly flooded with foreign 
currency (Bartlett et al., 52). 
About one-fourth of the (approximately) $100 billion from illegal drug sales smuggled out of 
the United States last year was reinvested in subsequent shipments of drugs (52). Some of the 
money is used to pay employees, but most of the profits go to the drug lords. In larger operations 
and in many small operations, the smuggler hires a professional launderer to take care of the cash 
problem for him. 
launderers use many tactics to get clean money back to their bosses. The use of "front" 
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businesses continues, but is not as popular as before because it is expensive and time consuming. 
The new drug traffickers prefer systems that may be set up quickly, allowing for immediate 
reinvestment, and new banking technologies have made this possible. As one bank executive 
boasted to a committee of the Canadian Senate in 1985: 
"I can hide money in the twinkling of an eye from all of the bloodhounds 
that could be put on the case, and I would be so far ahead of them that there 
would never be a hope of unraveling the trail. I am not kidding you. 
Technology today means that that sort of thing can be done through 
electronic means." (Naylor 12) 
J .D. Johnson, the Internal Revenue Service district director in Boston, explains that the 
availability of funds for immediate reinvestment is not the only reason smugglers demand instant 
liquidity: 
"In a typical laundering transaction [the drug smuggler] isn't worried 
about the Feds. He's worried about getting ripped off or killed. People in this 
business just don't live very long." (Fisher 34) 
The most dangerous way to get cash from street sales out of the United States is to ship it in 
packages to financial institutions abroad. Some use the mail, while others attempt to send or carry 
the money aboard boats and planes (Seper 113). Says Customs Service agent John Varrona: 
"We seize about a million dollars a month from passengers on commer-
cial airlines headed out of Kennedy. They put it in carry-on luggage, in bags 
they check through, and even tape it to their legs. A million dollars a month, 
every month." (113) 
Money may also be flown out of the United States on private planes, and sometimes planes 
drop off drugs and pick up cash. 
The most widely used technique for money laundering is known as "smurfing" or "structur-
ing," and can earn launderers commissions of up to 10% (113). The launderer first hires couriers, 
or "smurfs," to purchase money orders for $4,000-$9,999 each (Bartlett et al., 54). This is to avoid 
having the bank report the transactions to the government, as is required for transactions over 
$10,000 (under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970). The money orders are deposited to a simple front 
company, which probably exists only on the ledgers of the bank. 
Most of the money in the front company's account is wire- transferred to a bank account in 
a nation with tight banking secrecy laws. From there, the money may be transferred back to the 
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front company's account or to another front company "owned" by the street seller. These funds 
are at his discretion and are often the link to his detection, since he may become so flamboyant 
as to arouse suspicion. 
The rest of the money from the sales (about 20%) is used to purchase the next shipment of 
drugs. This usually involves exchanging the currency into pesos, which are used in Mexico and 
Columbia. 
Until 1983, money launderers were able to work with impunity as long as they kept their 
operations separate from sales activities. Apparently, they did not take President Reagan's dec-
laration of a "war on drugs" seriously. That year, Eduardo Prada was convicted as a co-conspirator 
who was "aiding and abetting" drug traffickers. Assistant United States Attorney Michael 
Feldberg traced a deposit in Prada's ledger and discovered that a deposit was transferred to an 
Alabama shipyard six days later. With this deposit, Prada purchased a shrimp trawler that was 
later stopped in Columbian waters, carrying 14,000 pounds of marijuana (55). 
This case, the first where prosecutors succeeded in finding a launderer guilty of a drug 
conviction, set a precedent that gave the Drug Enforcement Administration hopes of making a 
dent in the industry by tracing funds. It was the first major success of Operation Greenback, which 
sought to harm the drug trade by targeting institutions that aided launderers. Until the DEA 
began to try launderers on drug charges, their only hope of stopping them was to convict them 
of violations of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. 
The most important aspect of this Act is the $10,000-and- over reporting law. It requires that 
banks, savings and loans, brokerage houses, currency exhanges, car dealers, and casinos (added 
to this list in May, 1985) report all transactions involving more than $10,000 cash, to the Internal 
Revenue Service. The reporting form includes questions about the customer's occupation and 
requires his taxpayer identification number (Snitzer 88). 
This Act did little to stop illegal transactions. Until it was amended in 1987, it made no 
provisions for suspicious cash transactions, such as several consecutive deposits just under the 
reporting limit. The major problem with this legislation, however, was that until Operation 
Greenback began in 1980, it was simply not enforced. 
Banks complained that the reporting law only added to the impossible load of paperwork 
forced upon them by the government. "Operations failure" was the defense of many of the banks 
that were investigated under Operation Greenback. Judge Irving R. Kaufman, chairman of the 
President's Commission on Organized Crime, sympathized with the bankers, claiming that they 
were "unaware of their obligation under the law to report cash transactions. Or they just don't 
know what's going on in their organizations" (Fisher 34). 
Another explanation for the banks' failure to report large cash transactions was offered by 
Patrick Walsh, of the New England Organized Crime Strike Force: "Part of it has to do with not · 
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wanting to lose business. Money is money" ("My, What a Friendly ... ," Time, Oct. 1985: 79). 
Enforced or unenforced, the Bank Secrecy Act was full of loopholes, maximized by banking 
privacy laws passed during the Carter Administration. Under the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978 (which tied together many state laws), banks could not turn over information regarding 
suspicious transactions unless it involved more than $10,000 cash, or the investigating agency had 
a warrant. Banks did not report suspicious transactions because of the paperwork involved and 
because they were frequently liable for civil damages if the investigated transactions turned out 
not to be legal (Bartlett et al., 5). 
Launderers may bypass the Bank Secrecy Act by bribing tellers, which probably proves to be 
more efficient than using smurfs. In 1985, the Bank of New England was charged with failing to 
file withdrawals totaling $817 ,200 made by James McDonough, a convicted loan shark. In the 
investigation, it was discovered that he bribed the head teller with $400. At Christmas he brought 
so many bottles of wine to the bank that the gifts had to be distributed on a cart ("My, What a 
Friendly ... ," Time, Oct. 1985, 79). 
During the Reagan Administration assault on launderers, the penalties for failing to report 
transactions were stiffened. Under 1987 modifications to the Bank Secrecy Act, banks may be 
fined up to $500,000. Officers may be sentenced to up to twenty years in prison. These 
modifications also made smurfing a felony and required banks to report all suspicious transac-
tions, regardless of the amount of cash involved (Bartlett et al., 55). 
The year before, more anti-laundering legislation, recommended by Attorney General Edwin 
Meese, had been passed. These laws permitted government seizure of accounts and property 
purchased with drug money, which otherwise would have remained in the possession of the 
offender. The amount of property seized since the passage of the law has paid for the necessary 
investigations. 
Operation Greenback, which began in Florida in 1980, netted $38.5 million in dirty money 
seized, and $117 million in bank fines in that state alone (55). Investigators targeted Florida 
bacause 60%, or $6 billion, of the U.S. Federal Reserve's excess cash wound up in the Atlanta 
Federal Reserve's Miami branch, which indicated that the banks were receiving more in cash 
deposits than was necessary to conduct routine business (Seper 113). 
Beno Ghitis may be thanked for $240 million of the $6 billion imbalance. He washed an average 
of $1.5 million each business day for eight months. To make these deposits, he employed thirty 
to forty smurfs and paid Miami's Capital Bank $300,000 per month to receive his deposits. He 
worked out of an office above the bank (Bartlett et al., 53). Business Week reported in 1985: 
"Miami became 'the Wall Street of the drug trade.' Until a few years ago, 
it was common to see couriers standing in bank lines with duffle bags, 
suitcases, cardboard boxes, and shopping bags crammed with cash. 'We 
didn't think anything of it,' admits a Miami banker." (53) 
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After three years of Operation Greenback, Florida's banks began complying. As a conse-
quence, dirty cash shifted northwest, as shown in changes in regional Federal Reserve surpluses. 
From 1985-1988, the Miami Federal Reserve's cash surplus decreased from $6 billion to $4.8 
billion, but the surplus in Los Angeles grew from $165 million to $3.8 billion (Seper 113). 
This shift was due to several factors, including successful interdiction efforts off the south 
Florida coast and the increasing market share held by Los Angeles' drug dealing street gangs, but 
Operation Greenback played no small part in the shift. It was successful in Florida because it 
pressured bankers as well as smugglers, and charged defendants with drug charges instead of 
minor infractions of the Bank Secrecy Act. It is unfortunate, however, that simultaneous 
investigations did not occur in other U.S. banking centers to effect the expatriation, instead of the 
migration, of dirty money. But this hindsight should not stop us from recognizing the revolution 
in banking practices in southern Florida that occurred as a result of the changes in the Bank 
Secrecy Act, and a new commitment to enforcing them. 
In February, 1985, Operation Greenback moved in on Boston. Bank of Boston Corporation 
was charged with failing to report international cash transactions of $1.22 billion. $1.16 billion of 
this amount involved transactions with Swiss banks, which are notoriously secretive. From 1981-
1985, the bank received $529 million in small bills from Swiss banks, and shipped $690 million in 
bricks of $100 bills back by flying bags of money out of Logan airport on commercial flights. The 
bank was scandalized further when it was revealed that the Angiulos, a Boston family linked to 
the Mafia, purchased $1.3 million in cashier's checks from Bank of Boston in 1982. $250,000 of 
the payment for the checks was in cash. This case gained a great deal of publicity because of the 
$500,000 fine charged to the bank, the maximum penalty at the time. Bank of Boston managed 
to stay afloat, despite losing millions in City Council accounts (Moskowitz et al., 30; Fromson 39). 
Prosecutors rounded out their roster of the three largest banks in Boston by fining the Bank 
of New England and Shawmut Bank later in the year. 
InJ une of 1985, four large New York banks were fined a total of$1.2 million for failing to report 
transactions, and in September, Crocker National Bank in San Fransisco was fined a record $2.25 
million for" extensive noncompliance" with the Bank Secrecy Act. The bank failed to report 7 ,877 
cash transactions, most of which were transfers to and from Hong Kong banks.John Walker, the 
Treasury enforcement chief at that time, speculated that the deposits "could well have originated 
with illegal drug transactions" (Koepp 56). 
This case led the United States government to put pressure on the Hong Kong (British) 
government to force their banks to cut back on secrecy. In Hong Kong, business and government 
are dominated by the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, which was unwilling to limit secrecy until the 
U.S.DEApublicized the issue (Naylor 207). Cooperation between Hong Kong customs and police 
and the U.S., along with international drug enforcement agencies (in conjunction with the United 
Nations), led to several arrests. Hong Kong has since drafted laws much like the amendments 
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made to the Bank Secrecy Act in 1987, that provide for the tracing and confiscation of the proceeds 
of drug trafficking (Naylor 207). This, combined with concern about the political climate due to 
the Beijing massacre and the imminent return to Chinese rule, has pushed many launderers out 
of Hong Kong. 
Unfortunately, this only means that they migrate elsewhere. The rapid shift of contaminated 
cash from Miami to Los Angeles shows how flexible launderers can be. Traditionally, dirty cash 
has shifted from one country to another because of changes in the stability of governments, but 
while the U.S. led an international push to curb laundering, money shifted because of the 
changing secrecy laws as well. 
The U.S. DEA has a long list of nations whose banking laws protect depositors, and worked 
with the United Nations and the Council of Europe to force these countries to comply with our 
standards. The most prominent money laundering nations are discussed here. 
In 1983, foreign banks with branches in the U.S. first became vulnerable after a judge 
threatened to fine a Cayman Islands bank with a Florida branch $1.8 million for refusing to release 
information. Since 1986, banks in the Caymans and the Bahamas have released bank records on 
demand to the U.S. government (Naylor 207). 
Although the Council of Europe pressured Switzerland for several years to cooperate with 
other nations to decrease tax evasion and capital flight, Switzerland agreed first to meet with the 
U.S. in 1985 for talks on the subject (Naylor 118). Since then, Swiss banks have turned over 
account information for the prosecution of inside traders, and in 1987 reluctantly released 
information pertaining to drug trafficking (Burns 1). But since 1988, Switzerland has not loosened 
its secrecy laws. 
Swiss banks are not secretive only because they seek business. Claims RT. Naylor: 
"Swiss banks are famed for their stability and their conservativism. Their 
stability is attested to by the highest bank-failure rate per capita of any 
country in the industrialized world; and their conservativism is well demon-
strated by their record of fleeced clients. Swiss law protects the banks not 
only against curious or angry foreign governments but also against their 
customers. Swiss bank secrecy is often a trap for depositors. As they often 
have something to hide, their lips are effectively sealed, no matter if they are 
robbed by the very institution to which they have entrusted their money." 
(118) 
Money from Hong Kong, the Caymans, the Bahamas, and Switzerland often wound up in 
Panama, which had 119 branches of foreign banks and financial companies in early 1988. In 1985, 
the Federal Reserve's Miami branch had deposits of $1.3 million cleared through Panama 
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(Conway 8). Drug dealers were attracted to Panama by its secrecy laws, as well as its Spanish 
speaking bankers, its proximity to Latin America, and its official currency, the American dollar. 
In 1987, Forbes reported: 
"Collectively, commercial banks in Panama today hold more than $50 
billion on their books in U.S. dollar-denominated deposits. That's more than 
ten times the gross national product of a country ... doing only about $2.8 
billion in business annually." (8) 
The Panamanian banking industry folded because of a steady capital flight since 1983 due to 
the instability of the government, a revolt by Panamanian bankers against Noriega that began in 
June 1987 (Glenn 18), and the completion by the U.S. of what Meese hailed as "the largest and 
most successful undercover operation in federal drug law enforcement history" (Conway 8). 
This investigation, Operation Pisces, produced 387 arrests and the seizure of $50 million. As 
a result of Operation Cashweb/ Expressway, which also occurred from 1984-1987 in Panama, $10 
million was seized. The two operations also netted 28,000 pounds of cocaine. In these investiga-
tions, federal investigators posed as money launderers who moved $116 million through about 35 
banks for their Columbian customers (Conway 8). Agents worked with Noriega's police to seize 
accounts, and some believe Noriega's cooperation was motivated by concern that the U.S. would 
expose his own laundering activities if he was not helpful (Glenn 19). Whatever the case, Panama's 
banking industry has not recovered. 
Charles Morley, an investigator who has worked on Senate probes involving bank secrecy, 
warns: 
"I think what happens to Panama ['s banking industry] is going to be 
real instructive to a lot of other offshore centers that are just doing window 
dressing on cooperating with U.S. authorities. Real instructive." (Glenn 19) 
Before leaving office, Reagan again stressed the importance of the international cooperation 
which is necessary to stop highly mobile launderers. His focus on it at the summer, 1988 summit 
with leaders of Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan was clear in their joint 
statement: 
''The complexity of the problem requires additional international coop-
eration, in particular to trace, freeze, and confiscate the proceeds of drug 
traffickers and to curb money laundering." (19) 
They formed a special international task force on drugs that first convened in the U.S. 
Without Reagan's leadership in the fight against money launderers, however, the task force has 
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not addressed the issue of money laundering, because President Bush has all but abandoned it, 
although as vice-president he oversaw the South Florida Drug Task Force (Seper 115). This is 
particularly deplorable since every major money laundering "sting" has paid for itself. Since the 
completion this summer of Operation Polar Cap, a two-year investigation that used the same 
tactics as Operation Greenback to snare South American money launderers, the Bank Secrecy 
Act has reverted to ineffectiveness (Seper 110). This is a result of the enforcement of the reporting 
requirement, which has resulted in a backlog of reports at the IRS. Now it is they, not banking 
executives, who are complaining about paperwork. Said a senate investigator, 
'The government has allowed itself to be swamped by not hiring the 
people it needs to do audits. We have been told by insiders that the IRS has 
assigned 50 percent of its auditors to reviewing currency transaction 
reports." (Sheppard 15) 
These problems largely arose because this year the IRS abandoned the Reagan-endorsed 
plan to hire 2,500 new auditors before 1991 to review currency transaction reports (Gerth 12). This 
has led to the return of dirty money to U.S. banks, and experts expect this trend to continue. 
Ironically, U.S. pressure on other nations is precisely what has brought launderers back. Without 
rigorous reporting of transactions, the U.S. is open to launderers because of the decreased supply 
of other nations willing to accept funds earned illegally. Adds Stanley Twardy, U.S. attorney for 
Connecticut, 
''Traffickers prefer the stability of the U.S. and the safety of our banks. 
They know authorities are inundated by the reports so they have become 
bolder." (Sheppard 15) 
Two months ago, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh spoke to the American Bankers Association 
and implored: 
"In this country, under drug siege, we have the strongest motivation for 
sacrificing a certain measure of bank privacy ... to bring international money 
launderers to justice. Ripping out these illegal financial webs, pulling apart 
the money laundering networks-this is the most effective way to bring 
down the drug cartels." (Sheppard 15) 
Perhaps this speech will herald a new attitude about money laundering from the Bush 
Administration, but unfortunately, more than bankers' support is necessary. President Bush must 
make a strong statement against domestic and international launderers, and back it up with 
action. Great strides have been made since 1982, but because of increasingly efficient banking 
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technology and complacency on the part of President Bush, our nation may quickly revert to being 
the inactive, "innocent" bystander, as we allow billions in drug money to be laundered in American 
banks. 
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